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AbstrAct
After Indonesian independence in 1945, thousands of Indonesian Chinese 
repatriated to the Netherlands, the former colonizer. As opposed to other 
repatriates from Indonesia, who organized themselves into pressure groups and 
fought for a place in the national memory culture, the Indonesian Chinese in the 
Netherlands only formed strict socio-cultural associations and have generally 
stayed clear of identity politics. Usually, this divergence is attributed to the 
smooth integration and socio-economic success of the latter group, as well as 
to Chinese values, such as conflict avoidance. 
This article adds to this explanation by positing that this phenomenon 
has also been induced by the legacy of anti-Chinese violence in colonial and 
postcolonial Indonesia: respectively, Dutch discomfort to acknowledge the 
violent and discriminatory elements of its own colonial history, as well as a 
fear of offending the Indonesian government. Consequently, many Indonesian 
Chinese in the Netherlands have engaged in some form of public self-silencing.
Keywords
Indonesian Chinese; postcolonial migrants; national memory culture; self-
silencing. 
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IntroductIon1
It is a matter for psychologists to analyse why our parents’ generation was not 
afraid to be politically active during colonial rule [in Indonesia], but, now that 
the colonial power is gone, our generation [in the Netherlands] is afraid to act 
likewise (Translated from Dutch; Tjwan Sie Hok 2003: 13-14).
According to the sociologist Jolande Withuis, the Dutch public became aware 
in the early 1970s that many Jewish Holocaust survivors were struggling 
with historical trauma. As a result of this realization, these survivors became 
eligible to receive financial compensation and psychological healthcare 
from state funds. Shortly thereafter, many other groups followed suit and 
presented themselves as victims of historical injustice as well (Withuis 2002: 
8-11, 57-64, 239-241). Amongst these were sexual minorities, Afro-Surinamese 
descendants of slaves and repatriates from Indonesia. They appealed to the 
Dutch government and public to acknowledge and compensate their historical 
suffering in a similar manner. However, as they petitioned for scarce public 
resources, a certain level of competition became apparent. According to 
Withuis, “a low point in jealousy between victim groups are the repatriates 
from Indonesia, who complain time and again that, because they have been ‘too 
civil, clumsy or modest, the Jews go first’ and ‘receive more’ […]” (Translated 
from Dutch; Withuis 2002: 239).
Regarding these repatriates, as a result of the Indonesian independence 
in 1945, up to 300,000 people from the former Dutch East Indies migrated 
to the Netherlands. Besides smaller groups, such as the Dutch colonial elite 
and Moluccans who had fought on the Dutch side during the Indonesian 
war of independence (1945-1949), around 60% of them were so-called “Indo-
Europeans” - of mixed Indonesian and European descent. Obviously, some 
of these repatriates were soldiers and bureaucrats in the colonial government, 
whose jobs were invalidated after sovereignty was handed over. However, 
others left out of fear of violence and discrimination (Oostindie 2010: 26-32). 
Many of this diverse group had first suffered during the Japanese 
occupation of Indonesia (1942-1945), and again during the so-called Bersiap 
period (1945-1946). On top of that, after arriving in the Netherlands, they 
often faced a frosty reception from the native Dutch, were housed in poor 
conditions, and consequently felt unwelcome. To add insult to injury, many of 
those with a coloured skin reported to have experienced racial discrimination. 
Since the 1970s, amongst these repatriates – a large part of which became 
known as “Indisch” –, some have organized themselves into pressure groups, 
and appealed to the Dutch public and government to be acknowledged and 
compensated (Oostindie 2010: 33, 73-87, 91-96, 106-114). In some respects, 
1  The authors of this article wish to thank Peter Post for his critical reading of an earlier 
draft of this paper. Moreover, special thanks go out to Go Gien Tjwan, Ing Lwan Taga-Tan, Lea 
Pamungkas, Maya Hian Ting Liem, Patricia Tjiook-Liem, Paul The Gwan Tjaij, Siswa Santoso, 
Soei Keng Que, Soei Liong Liem, and Swanny Thee for sharing their personal views, as well 
as for their collaboration and support.
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they have succeeded. Amongst other things, the Dutch government in 2000 
apologized, and allocated the sizeable sum of 159 million euros to the Het 
Gebaar Foundation, to be distributed amongst its constituency of repatriates 
from Indonesia (Paasman 2002: 10-11; Schuurmans 2014: 34).2
However, not all have so vociferously and publicly asserted themselves. 
Many thousands of Indonesian Chinese, or Peranakan, also repatriated from 
Indonesia, but are generally not regarded to be a part of the Indisch community 
(Oostindie 2010: 33). Recent estimates of the number of Indonesian Chinese 
in the Netherlands range from 18,000 to 40,000 people (Rijkschroeff, The 
Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan 2010: 155; Thio May Ling 2007: 25; Oostindie 2010: 
29). Despite its size, academic interest in this group has been minimal. Dutch 
professor of (post-)colonial history, Gert Oostindie, has pointedly indicated 
why this has been the case, by giving the following reasons for more or less 
excluding the Indonesian Chinese from his recent publication Postcolonial 
Netherlands; Sixty-five years of forgetting, commemorating, silencing: 
[…] this well-educated and socially successful group rarely features in debates 
about minorities. What is more important is that they have displayed remarkable 
internal cohesion, but never contrived to translate this, either symbolically or 
politically, into identity politics – not in Dutch society and even less so towards 
Indonesia, where many familial and commercial ties are maintained to this day. 
(Oostindie 2010: 29.)
Therefore, according to Oostindie, while most other postcolonial minorities 
in the Netherlands organized themselves based on their own identity, and 
fought with variable degrees of success for public recognition, financial 
compensation, as well as for a place in the national memory culture – by asking 
for monuments, memorial centres and commemorations -, the Indonesian 
Chinese didn’t (Oostindie 2010: 91-97, 101-102). Why is this the case? This is 
the central question taken up in this paper. 
In the scarce literature published about this group, this question is usually 
answered as follows: the Indonesian Chinese who migrated to the Netherlands 
were a highly educated, mostly Dutch-speaking, and relatively well-off 
group, which made their integration into Dutch society very successful. 
Moreover, they possess Chinese cultural values, such as conflict avoidance. 
Consequently, they never felt the need to organize themselves into pressure 
groups (Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan 2010: 112-113, 147-149; 
Thio May Ling 2007: 116-117; Van Galen 1987: 144-146; Oostindie 2010: 28-
29). In this paper, by analysing the magazine of a Dutch Indonesian-Chinese 
socio-cultural association called Hua Yi Xie Shang Hui, it will be argued that 
the abovementioned perspective, though at first glance correct, glosses over 
2 350 million Dutch guilders, the equivalent of approximately 159 million euros, were 
allocated to Het Gebaar for distribution amongst individuals in the target group. On top of 
that, 35 million Dutch guilders, the equivalent of approximately 16 million euros, were granted 
to the foundation, to be spent on collective purposes (Stichting Het Gebaar, <http://www.
sawahbelanda.nl/stichting-het-gebaar/> consulted on 10-11-2016).
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possible reasons for self-silencing behaviour: most prominently, the legacies 
of anti-Chinese violence and discrimination in colonial and postcolonial 
Indonesia. 
However, before taking up this matter, as academic interest in this group 
has been minimal, and as most of the scarce literature is written in Dutch, the 
scope of this article is, first of all, to give an overview of the current state of 
research about this community. In doing so, Indonesian Chinese immigration, 
integration, identity, and associations in the Netherlands will be discussed.
Prologue
The development of the colonial economy in the Dutch East Indies from the 
seventeenth century onwards offered opportunities for the Chinese to form 
a commercial middle class, situated between the Dutch rulers and the local 
population. Therefore, the expansion of Dutch colonial power in Indonesia 
went hand in hand with immigration from China, and led to the growth of 
an already existing Indonesian Chinese minority (Blussé and Van Luyn 2008: 
133-147). Though there was a tendency amongst these Indonesian Chinese 
to acculturate or even assimilate into the local population, the Dutch had a 
vested interest in keeping the populations separated, in order to “divide and 
rule” (Coppel 1983: 5-24). Although the Indonesian Chinese were granted 
certain economic monopolies, later on, they had to live in specific quarters 
and obtain special passes to travel. In 1854, two different legal categories were 
created: “Europeans” and “Natives”, which both entailed certain rights and 
obligations. The Indonesian Chinese were categorised as “Foreign Orientals”, 
a category “equated” with the “Natives”, but which later on more or less 
began to function as a separate third category (Coppel 2002a: 133-134, 140-141, 
2002b: 157-168). According to the historian Charles A. Coppel, this colonial 
segregation-inducing policy helped to create delineations and competition 
between the indigenous population and the Indonesian Chinese, and thereby 
formed the blueprint for post-independence anti-Chinese violence and 
discrimination (Coppel 1983: 3, 13-14, 171). Indonesian Chinese migration to 
the Netherlands is closely entwined with this subject, as will be shown in the 
sections below. Roughly three phases in this community’s migration to the 
Netherlands may be discerned: 
1. Students, from approximately 1911 to 1940
2. “Repatriates” and “regretters”, from 1945 to 1964
3. “Refugees” from the violence of 1965/19663 
3 Naturally, there has been Indonesian Chinese migration to the Netherlands since the late 
1960s as well. However, on the basis of existing literature, it seems clear that most Indonesian 
Chinese migrated to the Netherlands between 1945 and the late 1960s, and information 
regarding the amount of Indonesian Chinese who immigrated thereafter is scarce. Nonetheless, 
from individual testimonies, it is known that some went to  the Netherlands on account of the 
anti-Chinese discrimination during the New Order regime (1966-1998), as well as on account 
of the (anti-Chinese) riots in May 1998 (Tan 1999: 18-24; Oei Tat Ie 1999: 43-45). Moreover, 
Van Galen indicates that, from the 1970s onwards, there has been chain migration (Van Galen 
1987: 144). Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan concur, and state that during the 1980s 
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students
Until 1908, the Indonesian Chinese were more or less barred from state 
education by the Dutch colonial government. However, in a few cases - 
predominantly children of wealthy individuals who were legally equated 
with Europeans - were Indonesian Chinese able to enrol at state schools.4 
A few other options were available. Rich Indonesian Chinese could enlist 
the services of private Dutch schools or send their children to missionary 
schools (Suryadinata 1972: 52; Van Galen 1989: 20, 39; Coppel 1983: 14-15; Li 
Minghuan 1998: 168).5 
However, given the considerable costs, a Dutch education was only 
possible for the privileged few. Moreover, some Indonesian Chinese parents 
preferred to send their children to Chinese schools: a preference which was 
partly fuelled by a surge in immigration from China from the 1860s onwards. 
Many of these new immigrants – also known as totok - were influenced by the 
rising tide of nationalism in China and, because their arrival was so recent, had 
more personal and emotional ties with their country of birth (Coppel 1983: 1-2, 
9, 11). Even amongst the Peranakan - those born and rooted in Indonesia, and 
oftentimes to some degree assimilated into the local population – there was 
a certain resinification. Therefore, from the late nineteenth century onwards, 
many private Chinese schools, culturally oriented towards China, were 
established (Peng Chia Oai 2013: 447, 452; Van Galen 1989: 21-22).6 Alarmed 
by these developments, the Dutch colonial government tried to drive a wedge 
between the Peranakan and the totok, amongst others by enacting educational 
reforms. In 1908, Indonesian Chinese children were permitted to enter state 
education - through the Hollands-Chineesche School - which allowed many 
more Indonesian Chinese to qualify for higher education, not only in the Dutch 
East Indies, but also in the Netherlands (Coppel 1983: 14-15). However, partly 
given the considerable income requirements, in practice these were mostly 
Peranakan, who given their length of stay in Indonesia were on average 
more wealthy, and who given their rootedness were more inclined to prefer 
a Dutch education over a Chinese one to enhance their future opportunities 
in the Dutch East Indies (Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan 2010: 50; 
Coppel 1983: 14-15; Van Galen 1989: 39-40). 
As a result of this reform, between 1911 and 1940 around 900 Indonesian 
several hundred Indonesian Chinese followed family members who had previously settled 
in the Netherlands. Moreover, they suggest that highly educated Indonesian Chinese, such as 
dentists, continued to emigrate to the Netherlands during the 1970s (Rijkschroeff, The Gwan 
Tjaij, and Verlaan 2010: 148).
4  It was possible for Indonesian Chinese to become “equated” with Europeans, though 
mostly for the rich (Coppel 2002a: 133-134; Laarman 2013: 35-36; Van Galen 1989: 39).
5  According to Li Minghuan, in 1863, missionary schools in Java started to accept Indonesian 
Chinese children. 
6  In 1901, the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan – Chinese Association - was established. This organization, 
with mostly Peranakan leadership, established many Chinese-language schools, with the aim 
of promoting Chinese culture amongst the Indonesian Chinese (Coppel 1983: 14; Suryadinata 
1972: 52-53). 
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Chinese pursued a higher education in the Netherlands (Van Galen 1989: 39-44; 
Li Minghuan 1998: 169). To put this into perspective, there were approximately 
1.2 million Indonesian Chinese in 1930, of whom around 29% was literate 
and of whom only about 3% could write in Dutch (Coppel 1983: 21). Clearly, 
this group of 900 was an elite within an elite. In 1911, these students founded 
their own student association in the Netherlands, called Chung Hwa Hui 
(CHH), the archives of which have been analysed by Dutch historian Kees 
van Galen. As until 1945 most Indonesian Chinese living in the Netherlands 
were temporary students, and as most of them became members of CHH, Van 
Galen’s work offers a unique window on this community before decolonization 
and violence in Indonesia motivated a portion of them to permanently settle 
in Holland (Van Galen 1989: 40-42, 49).
The associational proceedings show that the issues these students were 
discussing  – discrimination and the emergence of both Indonesian and Chinese 
nationalism – forced them to reflect upon their identity, as well as their future 
in the Dutch East Indies and, hypothetically, in an independent Indonesia. 
Were they Chinese, Indonesian or Indonesian-Chinese and should they remain 
visible as a distinctive cultural group or fully assimilate? According to Van 
Galen, most of them intended to build a future in their country of birth, went 
home after graduating, and were mainly concerned with their community’s 
wellbeing. Therefore, despite nominally supporting Chinese nationalism, and 
occasionally viewing Indonesian nationalism with sympathy, their sense of 
identity remained primarily Indonesian Chinese. Consequently, as the context 
in the Dutch East Indies changed, they opportunistically adjusted their views. 
To illustrate: although Indonesian nationalism was already in development, 
CHH championed Indonesian-Chinese legal equality with Europeans, while 
more or less neglecting the fate of the Indonesians. However, as the Indonesian 
independence movement gained momentum, they switched towards arguing 
for a multicultural Indonesia in which all groups – Indonesians, Chinese and 
Europeans – would be equal. After the declaration of independence in 1945, 
CHH still wouldn’t commit itself to supporting the new-born Indonesian state. 
Many of its members disagreed with this position, and left the association 
(Van Galen 1989: 200-201, 215-227).
Van Galen also shows that CHH students flirted extensively with Chinese 
nationalism during the 1920s and 1930s, for example, by celebrating Chinese 
festivals, organizing Chinese language education and regularly receiving 
the Chinese – Kuomintang - ambassador in Holland. However, according 
to Van Galen, these activities should not be interpreted as expressions of 
loyalty towards China. Instead, they were primarily fuelled by the hope that 
a stronger China would correspondingly enhance the marginal position of 
their community in Indonesia (Van Galen 1989: 203-214, 219-223). Li Minghuan 
makes a slightly different argument and states that these students’ renewed 
interest in Chinese culture was caused by a severe drop in their social standing. 
In Indonesia, they came from wealthy families and were treated with respect, 
but in Holland they were seen as merely colonial subjects. Consequently, 
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in order to restore their self-esteem, they took pride in Chinese culture and 
history (Li Minghuan 1998: 176-177). Unfortunately, both van Galen and Li 
Minghuan refrain from elaborating further on how these Peranakan students 
experienced daily life in the Netherlands. However, from individual memoires, 
amongst other materials, it can be established that these students did, indeed, 
occasionally face discrimination and that they felt as if the same colonial 
hierarchy that existed in Indonesia was being applied to them. For others, 
the cold weather and alien food will also have been reasons to long back to 
their country of birth (Oei Hong Kian 1998: 181-191, 273-282; Rijkschroeff, The 
Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan 2010: 88-89). 
It is important to understand the background of these students, as most 
authors on this subject agree that they, together with alumni from Dutch 
schools in the East Indies, formed a large proportion of the Indonesian 
Chinese who permanently settled in the Netherlands after 1945 (Li Minghuan 
1998: 169-170; Van Galen 1987: 143-145; Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and 
Verlaan 2010: 95, 101-102; Thio May Ling 2007: 23). However, these scholars 
provide conflicting information with regard to many other subjects related 
to the immigration history of this community. For example, when it comes 
to calculating how many Indonesian Chinese emigrated to the Netherlands 
after 1945, these authors come up with wildly divergent numbers. In part, 
this discrepancy may be laid at the door of the Dutch Central Agency for 
Statistics, which registered Indonesian Chinese immigrants by their official 
nationality – Dutch, Indonesian or Chinese – and not as “Indonesian Chinese” 
(Thio May Ling 2007: 25).7 To illustrate the resulting confusion, two authors, 
Li Minghuan and Thio May Ling, give estimates based on interviews, which 
makes their numbers hard to validate (Thio May Ling 2007: 25; Li Minghuan 
1998: 170). Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan’s numbers are based 
on sources which, in fact, only provide rough estimates (Rijkschroeff, The 
Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan 2010: 94-95). And, finally, Van Galen partly based 
his numbers on outdated literature (Van Galen 1989: 43).8
7  After the formal Indonesian independence in 1949, many Indonesian Chinese could choose 
between these three nationalities. 
8  These authors have come up with wildly divergent figures when it comes to the number 
of Indonesian Chinese currently living in the Netherlands, as well. Kees van Galen estimated 
the number of Indonesian Chinese in 1984 at 6750 people, by sampling phonebook listings of 
Hokkien names (Van Galen 1989: 43). Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan estimated 
the number of Indonesian Chinese living in the Netherlands in 2010 at 18,000, within which 
they included the first, second, third and fourth generation (Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and 
Verlaan 2010: 155). The Gwan Tjaij stated during an interview that he and his co-authors used 
Van Galen’s number from 1984 as a starting point and estimated the amount of Indonesian 
Chinese living in the Netherlands in 2010 by calculating natural growth, as well as the growth 
in membership of Indonesian Chinese associations and the numerous Indonesian churches. 
Finally, Thio May Ling mentioned in 2007 that there are between 20,000 and 40,000 Indonesian 
Chinese in the Netherlands, based on interviews with individual Indonesian Chinese (Thio May 
Ling 2007: 25). In 2010, Oostindie adopted Thio May Ling’s estimation (Oostindie 2010: 29). 
Van Galen’s methodology seems most exact, given the fact that many Chinese who migrated 
to Indonesia hail from areas in Fujian province where the Hokkien dialect is spoken. However, 
as many Indonesian Chinese changed their name to an Indonesian one during the New Order 
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Furthermore, the same vagueness appears when these authors discuss the 
motivation of Indonesian Chinese for moving to Holland. Where this subject 
is concerned, a profound difference in approach may be discerned between 
two categories of authors. On the one hand, there are four authors, Thio May 
Ling,9 Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan,10 who are members of, or 
connected to, Indonesian Chinese associations in the Netherlands.11 On the 
other hand, there are two “outsiders”: Dutch historian Kees van Galen and 
Chinese sociologist Li Minghuan. The former category generally discusses 
the influence of post-independence anti-Chinese violence and discrimination 
in Indonesia on Indonesian Chinese migration to the Netherlands only very 
briefly, or in euphemistic terms, whereas the latter category more unabashedly 
covers this subject, as will be illustrated below.
rePAtrIAtes, “regretters”, And refugees
After the Dutch handed over sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia 
on 27 December 1949, many Indonesian Chinese could choose between the 
Dutch, Indonesian and Chinese nationality.12 Those who opted for the Dutch 
nationality were thereafter regarded as Dutch citizens and when they migrated 
to the Netherlands therefore, viewed as “repatriates”. According to Van Galen 
and Li Minghuan, the Indonesian Chinese community in the Netherlands 
expanded to 1400 people between 1948 and 1957 (Li 1998: 169-170; Van Galen 
regime (1966-1998), as many Chinese immigrants in the late nineteenth and beginning of the 
twentieth century came from different Chinese provinces, as some Indonesian Chinese in the 
Netherlands probably didn’t have a phonebook listing, and because Van Galen only sampled 
a number of cities, this isn’t a watertight method either.  
9  Thio May Ling has analysed the Dutch Indonesian-Chinese association called De 
Vriendschap, while being a member of this association (Thio May Ling 2007: 12).
10  At the time of their joint publication titled Indonesische Chinezen in Nederland, all three 
authors were members of Lian Yi Hui, another Dutch Indonesian Chinese association. This 
book was published to celebrate this association’s 25th year of existence, and is the only general 
work about the Dutch Indonesian Chinese community ever written (Rijkschroeff, The Gwan 
Tjaij, and Verlaan 2010: VII). However, one of its authors, The Gwan Tjaij, indicated during an 
interview that, instead of being intended as an academic study, this book was primarily meant 
to inform interested parties in the Netherlands about the history and the role of the Indonesian 
Chinese and also to pass the history and heritage of the Indonesian Chinese in the Netherlands 
on to succeeding generations. These authors have all published about aspects of the Indonesian 
Chinese community in the Netherlands, or closely related subjects, before. (An interview with 
Paul The Gwan Tjaij, conducted by Alexander van der Meer, telephonic, on 28-11-2016.) 
11  These four authors will from now on be referred to as “Indonesian Chinese authors“, by 
which is meant that they are all connected to, or members of, Indonesian Chinese associations 
in the Netherlands. Taken literally, this characterization is incorrect, as only Thio May Ling 
and The Gwan Tjaij are Indonesian Chinese. 
12  As a result of the Dutch-Indonesian Round Table Conference in 1949, which stipulated the 
terms of Indonesian independence, those previously categorized as  “Foreign Orientals” - which 
included many of the 1.2 million Indonesian Chinese - were automatically given Indonesian 
nationality, with, however, the possibility of applying for the Dutch nationality (Jones 2007: 83; 
Laarman 2013: 65). As many Indonesian Chinese were also regarded as Chinese citizens, on a 
ius sanguinis basis, another possibility was to become a Chinese citizen, by rejecting Indonesian 
nationality (Coppel 1983: 26-27; Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan 2010: 95). 
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1989: 43). Li Minghuan and Van Galen don’t state any number for the years 
from 1958 to 1965, but, according to Van Galen, between 1960 and 1967, only 
a very small number of Peranakan arrived in the Netherlands, since migration 
was difficult, on account of diplomatic relations having broken down (Van 
Galen 1987: 144). 
Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan directly contradict the 
abovementioned information. According to them, between 1945 and 1958, 
around 2000 Indonesian Chinese repatriates came to the Netherlands. 
Thereafter, between 1959 and 1965, around 3000 so-called spijtoptanten or 
“regretters” followed suit (Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan 2010: 94).13 
In general literature about the process of repatriation from Indonesia to the 
Netherlands, many of those who migrated between 1958-1967 are categorized 
as “regretters”, because they initially opted for Indonesian nationality, but 
after 1957 changed their minds and wished to become Dutch, thus, in a 
sense, regretting their original choice. However, unfortunately for them, 
around 1957 diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands 
soured because of a territorial dispute over Dutch New Guinea, as well as the 
nationalization of Dutch companies which started in late 1957. Around that 
time, the Dutch government enacted more restrictive immigration policies, 
which made it more difficult for non-Dutch immigrants from Indonesia to 
migrate to the Netherlands, whereas previously this category had been treated 
with leniency. However, because of activists and pressure groups, as well as 
a new flow of migrants as a result of the dispute over Dutch New Guinea, 
the Dutch government’s attitude towards these “regretters” was usually still 
relatively benign.14 Nonetheless, some had to stay in the Netherlands for 
many years illegally, in fear of being deported, or as foreigners, before being 
naturalized (Jones 2007: 166-172; Laarman 2013: 54-75). It is likely that many 
Indonesian Chinese ”regretters” faced the same uncertainty. However, other 
than in individual memoires, there are only vague suggestions in the existing 
literature that this was the case (Tjwan Sie Hok 1997: 23-25; Twie 2004: 4-12; 
Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan 2010: 112). 
What motivated these “repatriates and regretters” to migrate to the 
Netherlands between 1945 and 1965? Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and 
Verlaan suggest that they were motivated by “affinity with the Netherlands” 
(Translated from Dutch; Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan 2010: 94).15 
13  The translation of spijtoptanten into English as “regretters” is derived from Gert Oostindie 
(2010: 52). 
14  Because of the conflict over Dutch New Guinea, Indonesia expelled around 40,000 Dutch 
nationals from Indonesia between 1957 and 1959. Moreover, for many of those who had become 
Indonesian by choice, but who had a different ethnic background, life became much harder. 
Therefore, until 1967, the Dutch government had special regulations in force which allowed 
“regretters” - and even those who had never had the choice to opt for Dutch nationality, but 
who could prove a certain attachment to the Netherlands - to become Dutch. After 1967, the 
regular immigration policy would apply to immigrants from Indonesia (Jones 2007: 170-171; 
Ellemers and Vaillant 1985: 42-43). 
15  Nevertheless, these three authors, in other chapters not related to migration to the 
Netherlands, do state that some Indonesian Chinese during this period were inclined to move 
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However, this is a somewhat unconvincing explanation. From the associational 
archives of the CHH student association, it is clear that most of the pre-war 
Indonesian Chinese students in the Netherlands intended to build their future 
in Indonesia.16 Moreover, thousands came to the Netherlands between the late 
1950s and 1964, many years after Indonesian independence, which attests to 
the same initial wish. Li Minghuan makes a different argument and states 
that the decision to migrate to the Netherlands during the early 1950s was 
made mostly on socio-economic grounds (Li Minghuan 1998: 169). Though 
Indonesia, indeed, faced economic troubles during the 1950s, this can only 
form a part of the explanation. Later on, Li slightly contradicts herself, by 
stating that many Indonesian Chinese who initially chose to be Indonesian 
were motivated to move to the Netherlands by anti-Chinese discrimination 
during this period (Li Minghuan 1998: 173). 
It is very remarkable that the abovementioned authors do not, other 
than euphemistically or very briefly, include anti-Chinese violence and 
discrimination between 1945 and 1964 in their considerations. According to 
Coppel, as the Indonesian Chinese in some regards functioned as a commercial 
middle class, situated in between the Dutch ruling class and the indigenous 
population, there were three discernible socio-economic classes in Indonesia 
just before the decolonization, in 1939: generally, the Europeans were wealthy, 
the Indonesian Chinese had middle incomes, and the Indonesians were poor. 
In addition to the resulting socio-economic competition, the Indonesian 
Chinese were associated with the hated Dutch colonialism, blamed for 
seemingly refusing to assimilate and, finally, suspected of harbouring a foreign 
allegiance, because of post-independence geopolitical quarrels with China - 
amongst other reasons, over its influence over the Indonesian Chinese minority 
– which altogether led to feelings of animosity between the two populations. 
As a result, the years between 1945 and 1964 featured periodical eruptions 
of anti-Chinese violence and discrimination (Coppel 1983: 11-51). This was, 
doubtless, a reason for some Indonesian Chinese, who initially consciously 
chose Indonesian nationality and intended to build a future there, to move 
to the Netherlands later on.17 
The third wave of migration was caused by the coup attempt in Indonesia 
in September 1965, which led to years of intense violence and, eventually, to 
a regime change from Soekarno to Suharto. To what degree the Indonesian 
Chinese were victimized during these years is the subject of ongoing academic 
debate (Cribb and Coppel 2009: 447-465; Melvin 2013: 63-91). However, it is 
beyond question that the Indonesian Chinese community suffered intense 
to Holland because of political instability and do elaborate on anti-Chinese discrimination 
(Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan 2010: 75-79, 103).
16  To illustrate, between 1949 and 1952, more than 90% of CHH members chose Indonesian 
nationality (Van Galen 1989: 210).
17  This is confirmed by some individual Indonesian Chinese interviewed by Li Minghuan 
(Li Minghuan 1998: 172-173). Van Galen hints at the same reason and states that those who 
came to the Netherlands in the late 1950s were mostly older Peranakan who worked for Dutch 
companies, but left because they experienced or foresaw discrimination (Van Galen 1987: 144).
48 49Wacana Vol. 18 No. 1 (2017) A. van der Meer and M. Eickhoff, Indonesian Chinese in the Netherlands  
violence – pillaging, forced displacement and rape – and that thousands were 
killed, which motivated many to seek refuge in the Netherlands (Cribb and 
Coppel 2009: 451). According to Li Minghuan, this created the biggest wave 
of Indonesian Chinese migration to the Netherlands: around 5000 people (Li 
Minghuan 1998: 170). However, once again, Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and 
Verlaan give conflicting information, and state that around 1500 Indonesian 
Chinese left for the Netherlands between 1966 and the beginning of the 1970s. 
According to the latter three authors, though many were still alumni of Dutch 
universities, others now had less affinity with the Netherlands, as some were 
born and raised in an independent Indonesia, and had studied in a different 
(Western) country (Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan 2010: 94, 104, 
147-148). 
Li Minghuan and Van Galen explicitly state that these migrants came here 
because of intense anti-Chinese violence, and Van Galen adds that many left 
under harsh conditions, with no time to take more than the bare necessities 
or say goodbye to loved ones (Li Minghuan 1998: 169-170; Van Galen 1987: 
143-144).  However, according to Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan, 
Indonesian Chinese around this time left for Holland as they “longed for 
peace” (Translated from Dutch; Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan 
2010: 95),18 and Thio May Ling states that they came here because the coup 
attempt led to “anti-Chinese sentiment” (Translated from Dutch; Thio May 
Ling 2007: 23).19 Clearly, compared to “outsiders” – Li Minghuan and Van 
Galen - Indonesian Chinese authors prefer to use euphemistic references to the 
influence of anti-Chinese violence and discrimination on Indonesian Chinese 
migration to the Netherlands. The next section will show that this distinction 
between these two groups of authors applies, though less markedly, to the 
integration of Indonesian Chinese in Dutch society as well.
IntegrAtIon And IdentIty In the netherlAnds
Most authors emphasize that the integration of Indonesian Chinese into Dutch 
society has been remarkably successful. Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and 
Verlaan, in particular, go to great lengths to emphasize this point. They state 
that most Indonesian Chinese could find a job and housing by themselves, 
quickly adjusted to a new society, are nowadays generally content and, on 
average, have a high income (Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan 
2010: VII, 96, 104, 124, 147-151, 155). Most authors explain this phenomenon, 
first of all, by what Oostindie has described as a “postcolonial bonus”: 
colonial subjects were already familiar with the Dutch language and customs 
18  Though in a different chapter, not related to migration to the Netherlands, Rijkschroeff, 
The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan do elaborate on the violence which began in September 1965. They 
state that around 30,000 Indonesian Chinese were killed and that the anti-Chinese violence and 
discrimination in those years compelled many to take refuge abroad, amongst other places in 
the Netherlands (Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan 2010: 79). 
19  Thio May Ling doesn’t give any estimation of the number of Indonesian Chinese who took 
refuge in the Netherlands because of the violence in 1965 and the years thereafter, but states 
that it was a “big wave” of migration (Thio May Ling 2007: 23). 
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(Oostindie 2010: 21-32; Thio May Ling 2007: 23-24; Li Minghuan 1998: 170-
172). However, for two reasons, the Indonesian Chinese were, compared to 
others with a comparable postcolonial bonus, even better situated to enable a 
smooth integration. First of all, they were, on average, highly educated. By a 
rough estimation, about a third of them had an academic title, predominantly 
in medical and engineering disciplines (Li Minghuan 1998: 171; Rijkschroeff, 
The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan 2010: 102-103; Van Galen 1987: 145, 1989: 40-42).20 
Secondly, Chinese/Confucian values, like thrift and frugality, are also credited 
as having contributed to societal success. Indeed, compared to the Indisch 
repatriates, who often initially had to be housed by the government, from 
individual narratives, it seems clear that the Indonesian Chinese community 
in the Netherlands was, to a high degree, self-reliant. In many cases, networks 
of friends and family already living in the Netherlands helped new arrivals 
out (Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan 2010: 96-97). Their smooth 
adjustment to Dutch society compared to other immigrant groups and the 
resulting absence from the political agenda seem to be a source of pride for 
Indonesian Chinese authors (Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan 2010: 
139-143, 148-150, 155; Han Hwie Song 1992: 32-33). 
According to Thio May Ling, the first generation of Indonesian Chinese 
identify strongly with the Dutch majority, as well as with their own minority 
(Thio May Ling 2007: 116). The second generation are even more rooted in 
the Netherlands. While 80% of the first generation marry and have friends 
predominantly within the Indonesian Chinese community, 80% of the second 
generation marry a non-Peranakan and two thirds of their friends are Dutch. 
The second generation cherishes the positive aspects of their Peranakan-
heritage, but they mostly identify as Dutch and rarely join Indonesian Chinese 
associations (Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan 2010: 151-153). 
Therefore, some of the first generation are somewhat worried that this will 
lead to a loss of their unique culture and history. 
Clearly, the Indonesian Chinese authors’ self-representation of their 
communities’ integration in the Netherlands is, to an extent, a “success 
story”. Though this seems to be factually correct, it is striking that they rarely 
mention negative experiences with the Dutch majority. Especially bearing in 
mind the fact that, in the general literature about the Indisch repatriates, it is 
made clear that many – especially those with a coloured skin – experienced 
racial discrimination (Oostindie 2010: 90, 221-222).21 The Indonesian Chinese 
authors did not specifically address this subject. However, reading between the 
lines, one may suspect that this has been the case for them, too (Rijkschroeff, 
20  And while in 1985, amongst the native Dutch, 1 in 1000 was a doctor, amongst Chinese in 
the Netherlands this was 1 in 100. Blussé and Van Luyn suggest that, as many of those doctors 
studied in the Netherlands, most of them will be Indonesian Chinese (Blussé and Van Luyn 
2008: 204). Though many were clearly highly educated, Van Galen briefly mentions that during 
the 1950s there was also a less wealthy group who arrived in the Netherlands, some of whom 
ended up in the restaurant sector (Van Galen 1987: 145).
21  Moreover, some of the Indonesian Chinese students who studied in the Netherlands 
between 1911 and 1940 reported having experienced the same.
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the Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan 2010: 141-142, 145; Thio May Ling 2007: 19-20, 
30-31). Individual testimonies are less ambiguous, but still not resentful, and 
even adopt a conciliatory tone (Oei Hong Kian 1998: 184-185). For example, 
an individual who came to the Netherlands in 1949 states:
I experienced discrimination from Dutch people. They addressed me as ‘Sukarno’ 
and on the streets we were called ‘nigger’. This changed over time. When we 
arrived [in Holland], many Dutch had probably never seen anybody who didn’t 
have white skin before (Translated from Dutch; Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, 
and Wu 1993: 63). 
Individual testimonies, especially that of the professor of Cultural Studies, Ieng 
Ang, who was born in Indonesia, but in 1966, at the age of twelve, went to the 
Netherlands, attest to the fact that a certain form of discrimination remained 
evident in later decades too, amongst other ways, by being constantly 
categorized as ”Chinese” by native Dutch (Li Minghuan 1998: 175; Ang Ien 
2001: 10-11). 
Regarding the complex Indonesian Chinese identity, most authors state 
that amongst the Peranakan in the Netherlands it is mostly made up of Dutch 
and Chinese elements: Chinese roots combined with a Western education and 
embeddedness. Identification as Indonesian is rare, but many do treasure 
Indonesian cultural traits out of nostalgia, and ties with family and friends 
living in Indonesia remain tight (Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan 
2010: 139-143, 151; Li Minghuan 1998: 173, 181; Thio May Ling 2007: 113-
115). However, most authors do mention that some of the first generation of 
Indonesian Chinese felt trapped between these three identities and countries 
and, consequently, perceived themselves as not really at home anywhere 
(Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan 2010: 97; Thio May Ling 2007: 20, 
24). In a 1998 publication, entitled Living among three walls? The Peranakan 
Chinese in the Netherlands, Chinese sociologist Li Minghuan covers this subject 
in the most detail: in Indonesia, they were regarded as Chinese, in Holland, 
as Asian, and in China, as foreign, too. Moreover, Li Minghuan states that, as 
the international status and prestige of China grew from the 1980s onwards, 
some felt as if their status in the Netherlands had grown similarly, which led 
to a certain resinification amongst the Indonesian Chinese in the Netherlands. 
This is an indication that the context of the Dutch society has had a great 
influence on the identifications of Indonesian Chinese in the Netherlands (Li 
Minghuan 1998: 174-175, 177-181).22
The integration of Indonesian Chinese in the Netherlands has certainly 
22  However, Li Minghuan’s perspective became progressively more positive. While in 1998 
she elaborated on the feeling of being nowhere at home, in later publications she seemed to 
emphasize more that many Indonesian Chinese in the Netherlands possess a transnational 
flexible identity which allows them to feel at home in many places. Moreover, she even 
suggested that Dutch Indonesian Chinese, when they emphasize their unique identity and 
combine the best of three cultures, have more socio-cultural capital to offer and, therefore, 
possess a competitive advantage over others (Li Minghuan 1999: 44-45, 2003: 228-230). 
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been very smooth, though Indonesian Chinese authors represented this as 
a process with little friction, whereas Chinese sociologist Li Minghuan has 
described possible negative experiences in more detail. Regarding the complex 
Indonesian Chinese identity in the Netherlands, almost all authors describe 
Indonesian Chinese socio-cultural associations as having played a major role in 
creating a feeling of togetherness and a little bit of “home” in the Netherlands. 
How this works will be described in the next section. 
AssocIAtIons
In 1987, Van Galen stated that, as most Indonesian Chinese were successfully 
integrated and possessed a large personal network of Indonesian Chinese 
friends and family, there was little need for Indonesian Chinese associations. 
Consequently, Van Galen characterized the Indonesian Chinese community 
as “a village without a name” (Translated from Dutch; Van Galen 1987: 145-
146). However, a few years later, there were actually already four Indonesian 
Chinese associations: Inisiatip (1977),23 Lian Yi Hui (1983),24 Hua Yi Xie Shang 
Hui (1987),25 and De Vriendschap (1989).26 This was the case because many 
Indonesian Chinese retired around that time and had more leisure time 
to spend on social activities.27 Nowadays, these associations have between 
100 and 500 members and share roughly the same goals, which are notably 
described by Thio (Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan 2010: 113-115).28 
Thio May Ling has studied De Vriendschap, and concludes that Indonesian 
Chinese become members of such associations because they enjoy spending 
time with people who share the same background and cultural identity. 
Sometimes, the members even know each other from their younger days in 
Indonesia (Thio May Ling 2007: 86, 88-93, 115-116). These associations, in 
other words, serve to create a sense of “feeling at home” in the Netherlands. 
Therefore, they organize socio-cultural activities which feature Chinese 
traditions - such as the celebration of Chinese New Year - as well as Indonesian 
and Western ones (Thio May Ling 2007: 70-83, 111-112). 
However, it is quite remarkable that these are exclusively socio-cultural 
associations. Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan note the same 
phenomenon and state that the Indonesian Chinese in the Netherlands seem 
to be politically inactive and are rarely members of interest groups, such as 
23  Inisiatip, http://www.inisiatip.nl/default.html, consulted on 10-11-2016.
24  Lian Yi Hui, http://www.vriendenkringlianyihui.com/, consulted on 10-11-2016.
25  Hua Yi Xie Shang Hui, http://www.huayixieshanghui.nl/, consulted on 10-11-2016.
26  De Vriendschap, http://www.verenigingdevriendschap.nl/, consulted on 10-11-2016.
27  An interview with Patricia Tjiook-Liem, conducted by Martijn Eickhoff and Alexander van 
der Meer, in Amstelveen, on 02-05-2016.
28  Van Galen emphasized in 1987 that many Indonesian Chinese enjoy a large network 
of - mostly - other Indonesian Chinese friends and family, who regularly meet up at social 
occasions such as weddings (Van Galen 1987, 145-146). Patricia Tjiook-Liem emphasized during 
an interview that the founding of these associations served to institutionalize these already 
existing personal ties, as well as to make new ones (An interview with Patricia Tjiook-Liem, 
conducted by Martijn Eickhoff and Alexander van der Meer, in Amstelveen, on 02-05-2016).
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labour unions and political parties (Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan 
2010: 112). Why is this the case? The four Indonesian Chinese authors give 
several explanations, which are listed below. 
First of all, as a successful and relatively well-off group, the Indonesian 
Chinese generally didn’t feel the need to organize themselves into interest 
groups. There were, in other words, simply no problems that needed to be 
addressed. However, they did feel a need to express and experience their own 
identity. Therefore, there are several Indonesian Chinese associations which 
focus on socio-cultural activities (Thio May Ling 2007: 39-40, 111; Rijkschroeff, 
The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan 2010: 113, 149).29
The second explanation has to do with Chinese/Confucian cultural 
values. Thio May Ling has asked members of the Dutch Indonesian Chinese 
association De Vriendschap, who are mostly first generation Indonesian 
Chinese, what they regard as their communities’ most characteristic traits. 
Amongst the answers were: hospitality, filial piety, community spirit, family 
values, thrift, independence, frugality, conflict-avoidance and political 
aloofness (Translated from Dutch; Thio May Ling 2007: 100-107). First of all, 
these seem to be mostly Chinese cultural values, which could explain a certain 
apolitical stance. Indeed, in the general literature about the Chinese diaspora it 
is sometimes remarked that Chinese minorities in the West generally display 
apolitical behaviour (Rijkschroeff 1998: 112-115, 195-196; Freedman 2000: 
2, 30-32, 130-132). Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan also note that 
many Indonesian Chinese regard themselves as guests in the Netherlands 
and consequently view it as inappropriate to interfere in political and societal 
issues (Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan 2010: 112). 
Thirdly, all four Indonesian Chinese authors – though very briefly - state 
that historical trauma is another explanation for this phenomenon. Thio May 
Ling argues that the Indonesian Chinese, as a relatively well-off minority, first 
in the Dutch East Indies and later in Indonesia, have often experienced being 
scapegoated for political and social problems. Therefore, in the Netherlands, 
they wanted to avoid attracting too much attention, by “working hard, being 
independent, law-abiding, conflict-avoiding and apolitical” (Translated from 
Dutch; Thio May Ling 2007: 104). However, Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and 
Verlaan put forward a slightly different argument. They posit that Indonesian 
Chinese who left for the Netherlands between 1960 and 1975 often did so for 
political reasons, and that those “who had been politically active in Indonesia 
could have got into trouble [if they had acted likewise in the Netherlands]. 
Against this background, you can imagine that they weren’t inclined to 
interfere in political issues in their new host country” (Translated from Dutch; 
Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan 2010: 112). What are these authors 
29  Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan also mention a few practical reasons for being 
apolitical. Some Indonesian Chinese who came to the Netherlands were already middle-aged, 
and therefore probably less enthusiastic about realising certain political ideals. Moreover, they 
state that, as immigrants, after arriving, many had to first focus on practical goals, such as 
finding a job, securing housing and raising children (Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, and Verlaan 
2010: 112). 
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somewhat vaguely and indirectly referring to?
After Indonesian independence, in the 1950s and the 1960s, many 
Indonesian Chinese - facing societal pressure to assimilate, as well as 
discrimination and occasional outbursts of violence – became politically 
active. There was one current amongst them which argued for integration and 
another which argued for assimilation. Baperki was the main organization 
promoting integration,30 by which they meant the right to remain a distinctive 
cultural group in Indonesia. Baperki became a mass organization, with 280,000 
members in 1965, and, moreover, running a hundred schools, which almost 
exclusively catered to Indonesian-Chinese children. As Indonesian politics, 
including those of President Sukarno, became increasingly left-leaning in the 
late 1950s, Baperki followed suit and adopted the position that socialism was 
a way of eliminating racial tensions in Indonesia. As the violence surrounding 
the regime change in 1965/66 generally targeted leftist groups and (alleged) 
communists, Baperki and, by association, the Indonesian Chinese in general, 
were targeted, as well (Coppel 1983: 17, 36-37, 43-45; Tsai and Kammen 2012: 
132-138).
Obviously, some of those who left for the Netherlands had been politically 
active in Indonesia and one may imagine they were, therefore, less inclined to 
do so again in the Netherlands. One of our informants called this “Baperki-
phobia”.31 Moreover, the fact that the Indonesian Chinese association De 
Vriendschap is explicitly open to non-Peranakan members is, according to 
Thio May Ling, directly related to historical experiences of being scapegoated 
in Indonesia (Thio May Ling 2007: 104, 111). Although Thio May Ling doesn’t 
elaborate further on this point, it could very well be that this is part of an effort 
to avoid being once again labelled as exclusive and superior, as Baperki was 
perceived to be by some Indonesians.32
To conclude, several explanations have been put forward as to why the 
Indonesian Chinese in the Netherlands are, by and large, apolitical and why 
they almost exclusively established socio-cultural associations. As has been 
shown in the introduction to this article, contrasting with the Indisch repatriates, 
the Indonesian Chinese in the Netherlands didn’t organize themselves into 
pressure groups to campaign for compensation and acknowledgement of 
historical suffering. This is most likely a part of the same phenomenon, since 
doing so would constitute a political act.  
However, all the above-mentioned economical, cultural and political 
explanations for this phenomenon might also be part of a collectively 
imposed self-image. First of all, there are other well-integrated and socio-
economic successful minorities who still organize themselves into pressure 
groups. Secondly, as the Indonesian Chinese are a highly Westernized group, 
30  Baperki is an abbreviation of Badan Permusjawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia.
31  An interview with Paul The Gwan Tjaij, conducted by Alexander van der Meer, telephonic, 
on 28-11-2016.
32  However, Thio May Ling doesn’t mention Baperki by name. Moreover, this author states 
that the open character of De Vriendschap could also be explained by the high level of integration 
attained by Indonesian Chinese in the Netherlands (Thio May Ling 2007: 104, 118).
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Chinese/Confucian values can only be part of the explanation. And finally, 
the anti-Chinese violence partly induced by Indonesian Chinese political 
self-organization in Indonesia is now 50 years in the past. Moreover, there 
are Indonesian Chinese who came to the Netherlands prior to the 1960s who 
weren’t targeted by the political violence. Therefore, it is important to trace 
other reasons why the Indonesian Chinese, in general, display apolitical 
behaviour and in this regard deviate from Indisch repatriates. In the following 
section, through analysis of the magazine of the Indonesian Chinese association 
Hua Yi Xie Shang Hui, this task will be taken up. 
Hua Yi Magazine
The Dutch Indonesian Chinese association Hua Yi Xie Shang Hui (HYXSH) 
has published a quarterly magazine, called Hua Yi Magazine, since 1988. For 
the purposes of the inquiry in this section, one issue per year from 1990 to 2016 
has been analysed.33 This magazine is mostly read by association members. 
Since contributors didn’t have to take the broader public into account, we 
assume that they could speak more freely and possibly hint at underlying 
explanations for Indonesian Chinese apolitical behaviour and for their 
deviation from other repatriates.34 
First of all, what became clear is that the articles published in Hua Yi 
Magazine did, indeed, generally stay away from controversial or potentially 
painful subjects, such as the anti-Chinese violence and discrimination in 
colonial and postcolonial  Indonesia.35 
In Table 1, the most dominant themes of articles published from 1990 
to 2016 have been listed, which indicates that the vast majority of articles 
featured relatively harmless subjects, to do with culture, history, identity 
and contemporary developments across Indonesia, China, and the West. As 
HYXSH is a socio-cultural association, this was to be expected.
33  The archives of the National Library of the Netherlands and Leiden University only 
possess issues of this magazine from 1990 to 2016. The years 1988 and 1989 are missing. See 
the references for a list of the issues analysed in this section.
34  Hua Yi Magazine has an editorial board, but members of HYXSH are encouraged to publish 
articles too. However, especially in the earlier years, the editors wrote a large portion of the 
articles. Therefore, the results of this analysis could be influenced by the preferences of a few 
individual editors. Furthermore, the categorization applied to the articles – see Table 1 – is of 
course inherently subjective, but only serves to indicate a trend in the subjects of the articles. 
35  Moreover, as this is an associational magazine, there are also many articles that deal with 
associational matters, such as announcements or reports of associational activities. 





Culture 130 13 25 9
History 67 39 34 17
Contemporary 
developments
18 8 8 -
Identity 50 2 2 17
Table 1 shows that most articles on these subjects focus on China - its 
history, culture and contemporary developments. Moreover, when Indonesian 
Chinese identity is discussed, Chinese cultural traits seem to be dominant. 
Furthermore, several authors express the view that China is important to the 
Indonesian Chinese in the Netherlands, as the international status of China 
affects their status in the Netherlands. As Han Hwie Song put it in 2004:
 
The Chinese in Indonesia regarded China [during the 1960s] as the rising star in the 
East which could protect her people, domestically and abroad. In the Netherlands 
today, our social standing is still dependent upon the status of China. (Translated 
from Dutch; Han Hwie Song 2004: 19-20.)
Therefore, in many articles, the rise of China since the 1980s is applauded. In 
some respects, this seems to be a re-assertion of the phenomenon which Van 
Galen and Li noted, regarding Indonesian Chinese students in the Netherlands 
during the 1920s and 1930s. In these decades, they similarly hoped that a 
strong China would correspondingly enhance their societal position (Van 
Galen 1989: 219-223; Li Minghuan 1998: 176-177).
There were numerous articles, especially in the first volumes, which 
stressed the importance of integrating in, and being loyal to, the Netherlands. 
Quite remarkably, several times this aspiration was explicitly presented as a 
lesson learned in Indonesia. For example, in 2002, Liem Tiong Biauw stated 
that:
 
We should, wherever possible, join political parties and be loyal to the Dutch 
people and the Dutch royal family. Otherwise, others will decide our fate […] as 
we experienced […] in 1949. We didn’t help Soekarno with his nation-building, 
nor did we show our loyalty to the Indonesian people. (Translated from Dutch; 
Liem Tong Biauw 2002: 7-13.)   
Moreover, Indonesian Chinese political inactivity in the Netherlands has 
quite often been discussed in Hua Yi Magazine. The earlier volumes regularly 
featured appeals to HYXSH members to become politically more active. 
However, most of the time, these were calls for Indonesian Chinese to pioneer 
Table 1. Number of articles featuring culture, history, contemporary developments 
and/or Indonesian Chinese identity, across China, Indonesia, the West, and those 
specifically about the Indonesian Chinese, in Hua Yi Magazine from 1990 to 2016.
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the political organization and integration of the broader Chinese minority in 
the Netherlands, and to help out recent immigrants from China who weren’t 
yet familiar with the Dutch language and customs and who, therefore, had 
trouble accessing the Dutch welfare state (Han Hwie Song 1990a: 19-23).36 
There were no appeals for the Indonesian Chinese to organize themselves 
into a political pressure group, to be acknowledged and compensated for 
their historical suffering, nor calls to become a part of the Dutch national 
memory culture. 
However, contrary to expectations, Dutch colonial history, including 
anti-Chinese colonial policies, was amply discussed and explicitly criticized.37 
Indonesian Chinese political inactivity in the Netherlands is sometimes even 
perceived to be the direct result of these policies. In 2003, Tjwan Sie Hok 
stated that the socio-cultural focus of HYXSH is “to compensate for political 
inactivity”, and that: 
The fear of being politically active […] is a colonial legacy. Previously, the colonial 
ruler possessed a monopoly on politics. We were expected to be obedient and not 
participate. Talking about trivial matters was no threat to the colonial government. 
(Translated from Dutch; Tjwan Sie Hok 2003: 12-14.)
Moreover, the current Indonesian Chinese status in the Netherlands has even 
been equated with colonial times. When, in 2004, the Indonesian Chinese 
were excluded from the Dutch governmental policy regarding the Chinese 
minority, Robert Liem rhetorically asked: ”Is this another divide-and-rule 
policy, [this time] applied to the Chinese in the Netherlands?” (Translated from 
Dutch; Robert Liem 2005: 5-8). Another author, Peter B.K. Tan, denounced 
the state-sponsored national celebration in 2002 of the 400th birthyear of the 
Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC): The Dutch East India Company, 
which initiated Dutch colonialism in Indonesia. He went on to explain that 
VOC is an abbreviation for “Vernedering, Onderdrukking en Corruptie”, which 
translates as ‘humiliation, oppression and corruption’ (Translated from Dutch; 
Tan 2002: 27-30). Though the subjects shown in table 1 constituted the vast 
majority of the articles, apparently, frustration and historical grievances about 
Dutch colonial rule are, contrary to what could be expected based on the 
36  There were 75 articles that featured the topic of integration and 27 which featured the 
political inactivity of the (Indonesian) Chinese in the Netherlands. Many of these writings 
contained calls to the Indonesian Chinese to take on a pioneering role and shoulder the 
responsibility for the broader Chinese minority in the Netherlands to succeed, in both respects. 
In particular, Han Hwie Song, who has been the chief editor of Hua Yi Magazine from 1988 until 
2003, regularly called upon HYXSH members to take on this role. However, it remains unclear 
if HYXSH truly engaged in closer ties with the broader Chinese minority in the Netherlands. It 
is telling that there are almost no articles which are able to indicate to what degree this objective 
had been attained. Moreover, there were progressively fewer articles featuring these topics, 
from roughly 2008 onwards, which suggests a loss of interest. 
37  In sixteen articles, Dutch colonial policies towards the Indonesian Chinese were explicitly 
denounced and characterized as having caused a great deal of sorrow. There were many more 
articles in which the colonial era was discussed and where – especially when reading between 
the lines – it is possible to note a subtle feeling of indignation. 
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literature discussed in the previous sections, still present, at least in articles 
by some contributors.38
The same goes for other potentially painful episodes of Indonesian 
Chinese history, such as the post-independence anti-Chinese violence and 
discrimination in Indonesia. This subject was discussed or touched upon a total 
of 27 times.39 On 19 occasions, it was discussed indirectly or in euphemistic 
terms. On six occasions, the anti-Chinese violence was addressed directly 
and unabashedly. And finally, on two occasions, an author partly blamed the 
anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia on the Indonesian Chinese themselves. An 
example of the latter is Peter B.K. Tan, who in 1999 recalled that, during his 
youth in Indonesia, many Indonesian Chinese were very rich and often had 
Indonesian servants, who were sometimes treated as slaves. He rhetorically 
asks:
 
Are the Chinese in Indonesia to blame for the jealousy, hate and anger […] against 
the Chinese, and has this been the reason for the periodical [anti-Chinese] rioting? 
(Translated from Dutch; Tan 1999: 18-23.)
 
Sometimes the violence is discussed directly. For example, Twie Marinkelle-
Tan in 2004 states that, in 1965:
 
There was a large-scale persecution of anyone suspected to have communist 
sympathies. The Chinese were seen by one side as collaborators with the former 
colonial ruler, and by the other as collaborating with communism. (Translated 
from Dutch; Twie 2004: 4-12.)
However, most of the time the violence and discrimination is only briefly 
touched upon or, indeed, ignored altogether. Twice, authors blame the fact 
that many Indonesian Chinese had to leave Indonesia in the 1960s and 1970s 
on the Cultural Revolution in China. As one of those authors, Han Hwie Song, 
is usually very well informed, this seems to be a conscious strategy to avoid 
discussing the anti-Chinese violence committed by Indonesians (Han Hwie 
Song 1990b: 8-10; Kho 1995: 37-41).
In general, the articles that feature non-controversial subjects – as shown 
in Table 1 – dwarf the number of articles in which anti-Chinese violence and 
discrimination are discussed. Moreover, some events in Indonesia that directly 
relate to historical events which Indonesian Chinese in the Netherlands could 
have experienced, or of which family members in Indonesia could have been 
38  Sometimes, the feeling of indignation over Dutch colonial policies seems to be extrapolated. 
For example, one author, Wim Wei-Chun Ma, stated that the West has achieved its dominant 
position in the world during the colonial era in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, which 
“went hand in hand with unscrupulous exploitation, including slavery”, which, he adds, “was 
abolished in the Netherlands only 150 years ago” (Translated from Dutch; Ma 2013: 34-38).
39  There were twenty articles which featured anti-Chinese violence and discrimination in post-
independence Indonesia, in general. On top of that, on seven occasions, an author  specifically 
discussed the degree to which the Indonesian Chinese were targeted during the violence in 
1965/66.
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the victim, were not elaborated upon in Hua Yi Magazine. For example, the 
anti-Chinese riots in May 1998, when hundreds of Indonesian Chinese were 
killed, raped and tortured, were only once touched upon in the issue of June 
1998 (Liem Tong Biauw 1998: 18-24; Suryadinata 2001: 506-507). Similarly, Hua 
Yi Magazine in March and June of 2016 didn’t deal with the congress that was 
organized in April 2016 in Jakarta, at which, for the first time, survivors of the 
violence in 1965/1966 could publicly speak at a government-organized event.40
Why is it that Hua Yi Magazine generally steers clear of discussing the 
violence and discrimination in Indonesia that forced some to permanently 
settle in Holland? A person involved with Hua Yi Magazine, who wishes to 
remain anonymous, stated in an interview that amongst contributors to the 
magazine there exists “a common practice not to write about controversial 
subjects”. He explained that both the Dutch colonial and the postcolonial  anti-
Chinese violence and discrimination in Indonesia are regarded as containing 
controversial elements. As has been shown in previous sections, scholars with 
ties to Indonesian Chinese associations – Rijkschroeff, The Gwan Tjaij, Verlaan 
and Thio May Ling – also seemed reluctant to elaborate on these subjects, 
compared to relative outsiders – Chinese sociologist Li Minghuan and Dutch 
historian Kees van Galen. What could be the reason for this being the case? 
The anonymous source gave two pragmatic political reasons for the 
existence of this common practice amongst contributors to Hua Yi Magazine. 
Firstly, they don’t want any negative consequences for their family and friends 
in Indonesia. Secondly, they don’t want to criticize their host country, the 
Netherlands, too explicitly, as they fear that this could damage their societal 
status. Our source went on to explain that many – especially before receiving 
a permanent residence permit or naturalization – still consider themselves as 
guests in the Netherlands. For the same reasons, during the Cold War, they 
were generally wary of publicly denouncing Suharto, a Western Cold War 
ally. However, our source also mentioned that, as Dutch colonial history is 
still, to some degree, a sensitive subject in the Netherlands, they are reluctant 
to criticize it too publicly. These might be additional reasons to explain why 
the majority of the Indonesian Chinese have never organized themselves into 
pressure groups, nor demanded compensation for the historical suffering that 
prompted their migration to the Netherlands.41 
dutch nAtIonAl dIscourse And fAmIly tIes to IndonesIA
Considering the reference to colonial history as a still sensitive subject in the 
Netherlands, it is imperative, in these concluding remarks, to touch upon the 
national discourse regarding Dutch colonial history in Indonesia. According 
to Paul Bijl, for a long time, the Dutch saw themselves as a relatively benign 
40  Joe Cochrane, “After long silence, Indonesia allows talk of anti-communist atrocities”, New 
York Times 17 April 2016. 
41  An interview conducted by Alexander van der Meer. The source wishes to remain 
anonymous. 
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imperialist (Bijl 2012: 449).42 Bijl also stated that the Dutch, therefore, seem 
to suffer from aphasia when it comes to the colonial violence which they 
perpetrated. Consequently, “the victims of colonialism are not memorable 
within a national context and there is no language available to discuss them 
as part of Dutch history” (Bijl 2012: 458). 
Building on Bijl’s theory, an interesting hypothesis can be posited to explain 
Indonesian Chinese silence, in contrast to the other repatriates from Indonesia, 
who did vociferously assert themselves in a bid to become part of the Dutch 
national memory culture.  Indisch repatriates in the Netherlands mostly drew 
attention to the historic circumstances surrounding their repatriation during 
the 1940s and 1950s – suffering during the Japanese occupation (1942-1945) 
as well as during the Indonesian war of independence (1945-1949), and a 
cold reception in the Netherlands – but, in essence, didn’t challenge the 
abovementioned Dutch self-representation as the ‘benign imperialist’. In fact, 
many of them were part of the colonial elite and, therefore, their narrative, to 
some degree, corresponded with the national one (Oostindie 2010: 131, 134, 
140).43 If, on the other hand, the Indonesian Chinese draw public attention 
to the historic circumstances of their repatriation, this could pose a direct 
challenge to the Dutch national self-image, as the seeds of anti-Chinese 
prejudice and violence were at least partly sown by the centuries-old Dutch 
discriminatory, violent, and segregation-inducing colonial policies, of which 
many Indonesian Chinese were victims. 
It may be seen, from the example of the Korean Americans, that minorities 
whose narrative could challenge the national discourse of their host country 
can silence themselves, out of fear for their societal position (Ramsay Liem 
2007: 153-154, 158-162).44 Therefore, this historical background has likely been 
a stimulus for Indonesian Chinese in the Netherlands to engage in some form 
of self-silencing. However, at the same time, many of the Indonesian Chinese 
who migrated to the Netherlands belonged to rich families which attained their 
wealth by being part of the colonial system. It is plausible that this ambiguity 
42  Building on Bijl’s ideas, historian Chris Lorenz hypothesized that the Dutch regarded their 
military action during the Indonesian war of independence (1945-1949) as a humanitarian 
and just intervention. Information which conflicted with this self-image, such as massacres 
committed during this war, was actively suppressed, not least by the veterans of the said war 
(Lorenz 2015: 110, 128-129).
43  Even more so, Oostindie posits that the Indisch repatriates to a large degree formed the 
Dutch national discourse by struggling “against imputations of morally wrong colonialism” 
(Oostindie 2010: 137). Consequently “the contemporary Dutch memory of colonialism reflects 
something of that distant past, but also, and perhaps more so, serves as a gesture towards the 
postcolonial communities that feel particularly involved with this history. Such gestures may 
easily come at the expense of historical consistency” (Oostindie 2010: 131). 
44  Ramsay Liem illustrates such a case by discussing Korean Americans who fled to the 
United States because of the Korean War (1950-1953). The U.S. remembered its role in this 
war, amongst others, as heroically halting the expansion of communism and thereby saving 
South Korea. A section of the Korean refugees, however, had suffered greatly as a result of, 
amongst other things, American military action. Nonetheless, they kept silent, as they feared 
that publicly asserting their victimhood would undermine the American heroic self-image 
(Ramsay Liem 2007: 153-154, 158-162). 
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constituted another reason to let sleeping dogs lie.
Secondly, during one interview, it was confirmed that the wellbeing of 
family and friends in Indonesia was a reason for some Indonesian Chinese in 
the Netherlands to steer clear of public discussion of controversial subjects.45 
Considering the historical context of the Suharto regime (1966-1998), it is 
certainly plausible that Indonesian Chinese in the Netherlands have felt this 
concern,46 as many anti-Chinese discriminatory policies were enacted during 
these years.47
To conclude, following Dutch sociologist Withuis, who claims that 
stressing individual and collective trauma is a dominant way of generating 
social recognition and influence in the Netherlands, the Indonesian Chinese 
have, generally speaking, as a group, dissociated themselves from this 
dominant “trauma culture”.48 It seems that most Indonesian Chinese are 
genuinely content with their lives in the Netherlands (Rijkschroeff, The 
Gwan Tjaij and Verlaan 2010: 155), and don’t nurture an identity based on 
historical victimhood.49 However, the suggestion that there are consequently 
no grievances over historical injustices committed against them is erroneous. In 
Hua Yi Magazine, some contributors do express frustration over Dutch colonial 
policies, the Suharto regime and anti-Chinese violence and discrimination 
in Indonesia, in general. However, no pressure groups were organized to 
publicly address these frustrations. 
The arguments presented by scholars only partly explain this phenomenon: 
Indonesian Chinese are successfully integrated, relatively wealthy, possess 
Chinese cultural values, such as conflict avoidance, and memories of the dire 
consequences of political self-organization in the 1950s and the early 1960s in 
Indonesia still haunt them. However, as has been shown in this article, this 
phenomenon has also at least partly been induced by the fear of speaking out, 
45  An interview with Patricia Tjiook-Liem by Martijn Eickhoff and Alexander van der Meer, 
in Amstelveen, on 02-05-2016.
46  However, The Gwan Tjaij stated, during an interview, that this phenomenon applies mostly 
to the first generation of Indonesian Chinese who migrated to the Netherlands and hardly 
applies, at all, to members of the second generation, who were born in Holland (An interview 
with Paul The Gwan Tjaij, conducted by Alexander van der Meer, telephonic, on 28-11-2016).
47  Finally, one author in Hua Yi Magazine, Tjwan Sie Hok, mentioned several times that the 
Dutch secret service had spied on some of them during the Cold War. He suggested that this 
was the case because some Indonesian Chinese had, indeed, had leftist sympathies (Tjwan Sie 
Hok 1997: 23-26). Moreover, he referred to links between Western secret services and the Suharto 
regime (Tjwan Sie Hok 2000: 30-32). Though it is unlikely that many Indonesian Chinese in the 
Netherlands were under the scrutiny of the secret services, for some, the mere possibility that 
this might have been the case could have been a reason for not publicly asserting themselves. 
48  However, during an interview The Gwan Tjaij mentioned that he knows quite a few 
Indonesian Chinese who had applied for compensation from the Dutch government trough the 
Het Gebaar Foundation in 2001. However, this claim was negotiated by an Indisch repatriate 
foundation, centered around the main grievances of the Indisch community. Therefore, it can 
be concluded that, although some Indonesian Chinese individuals joined this claim, this in fact 
didn’t constitute an instance of Indonesian Chinese identity politics (an interview with Paul 
The Gwan Tjaij, conducted by Alexander van der Meer, telephonic, on 28-11-2016). 
49  An interview with Soei Keng Que, conducted by Alexander van der Meer, telephonic, on 
08-11-2016. 
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on account of the long arm of the Indonesian government, as well as Dutch 
discomfort about acknowledging the violent and discriminatory elements of its 
own colonial past. Moreover, as the Indonesian Chinese also, to some degree, 
cooperated with the Dutch colonial rulers, they can, in a sense, be viewed as 
partners and victims simultaneously. This ambiguity could have hindered 
the development of an identity as “victim” and thereby further complicated 
the construction of a narrative that would serve to publicly address historical 
injustices committed against them. Consequently, the Indonesian Chinese 
in the Netherlands are not only a living legacy of colonial and postcolonial 
violence - as many were directly or indirectly compelled by those reasons to 
move to the Netherlands - but are, at the same time, bound by these legacies.
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